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THE SUPREME COURT, WARRANTLESS 
SEARCHES, AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON* 
Mr. Justice Powell recently wrote: "There is no more basic constitu-
tional rule in the Fourth Amendment area than that which makes a war-
rantless search unreasonable except in a few 'jealously and carefully 
drawn' exceptional circumstances. " 1 Expressions of agreement with 
Justice Powell's observation are not difficult to locate for almost every 
contemporary Justice. 2 It is somewhat anomalous, therefore, to find that 
once one moves beyond mere generalizations as to the meaning of the 
fourth amendment in respect to the significance of a search warrant, there 
has been very little agreement among the Justices as to the proper approach 
to the solution of warrantless search cases. 3 Indeed, one of the principal 
sources of difficulty with the Supreme Court's warrantless search cases has 
been the lack of a working majority espousing a consistent and logical ap-
proach to the solution of the various problems facing the courts and law 
enforcement officers. 4 
The basic area of disagreement among the Justices does not lie in the 
assertion that warrantless searches are presumptively invalid. Rather, the 
members of the Court have historically disagreed as to the factors that 
must exist in order to justify classifying the situation as sufficiently "ex-
ceptional" as to dispense with the need for a warrant. The controversy has, 
*B.B.A., 1965, Ohio University; J.D., 1968, Ohio State University. Professor and 
Associate Dean, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, William and Mary College.- Ed. 
1 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,427 (1976) (concurring opinion). 
2 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 242 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 451 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (Stewart, J.); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
528-29 (1967) (White, J .), quoted with approval in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 
338,352-53 (1977) (Biackmun, J.). But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509-10 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting): "The rele-
vant test is •.. the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances. The test of 
reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on its own facts." 
3 See notes 10-15 infra and accompanying text. 
4 Cf. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of 
Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973). ("[T)he fourth amendment cases are a mess.") The state of 
the Court's warrantless search cases might be compared with the Court's "political question" doc-
trine as it existed at the time Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was decided. In attempting to ex-
pose the attributes of the doctrine in Baker, Justice Brennan described the Court's prior political 
question cases as involving "attributes which, in various settings, diverge, combine, appear and 
disappear in seeming disorderliness." /d. at 210. 
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for the most part, involved the two major exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement-search incident to arrest and the so-called "automobile 
exception. " 5 In the case of each exception, perceived exigencies-fear for 
the safety of the arresting officer and possible loss or destruction of 
evidence in the case of search incident to arrest,6 and preservation of 
evidence in the case of the search of an automobile7 (given the mobility of 
the item to be searched)-have been articulated as the justifications for 
dispensing with the need for a warrant prior to the search. The utilization 
of such a standard has led to a number of cases in which defendants have 
challenged the finding of the existence of exigent circumstances in their 
particular cases, even though they involved a search incident to arrest or an 
automobile search. In the cases involving a search incident to arrest, the 
defendants have attempted to show, as a matter of fact, that the exigencies 
of fear for the safety of the arresting officer and/ or fear of possible 
destruction or loss of evidence were not present. 8 In the automobile search 
cases the same type of argument has been made: that is, even though an 
automobile was searched, possible loss or destruction of evidence was not a 
realistic fear in fact sufficient to dispense with the need for a warrant.9 
On one side, which apparently includes a majority of the current 
members of the Supreme Court, 10 are those who accept the view that the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement are based generally upon the sup-
posed existence of "exigencies" necessitating the need for prompt action, 
i.e., a warrantless search. However, they would refuse to permit an inquiry 
in an individual case concerning the existence, in fact, of"exigencies" so 
s Other so-called "exceptions" to the warrant requirement would include (1) hot pursuit, 
(2) plain view, (3) emergency situations, and (4) consent. See United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 
76 (2d Cir. 1973). 
6 Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). For a discussion of the right to search in-
cident to arrest, see Aaronson & Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
of Search Incident to Arrest, 64 GEo.L.J. 53 (1975). 
7 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). There are, however, two additional 
grounds upon which searches of automobiles have been justified. One relates to the inherent dif-
ference between automobiles and other constitutionally protected areas. See text accompanying 
note 130 infra. The other justification relates to the frequency of police contact with automobiles. 
See text accompanying note 124, infra. For a discussion of the subject of warrantless automobile 
searches, see Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REv. 835 
(1974). 
8 See,e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and text accompanying notes 
74-84 infra. 
9 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), and text accompanying notes 94-102 
infra. 
10 See Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 77 (1974) 
("All one can say is that, for the moment, the see-saw between the two clauses of the [fourth] 
amendment is tilted away from the warrant clause.") See generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 
800 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
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long as the facts generally supported the inclusion of the case within one of 
the exceptions} 1 Although this side has not launched an all-out attack on 
the fundamental concept requiring the need for "exceptions" in the first 
instance (that is, that warrantless searches are presumptively invalid), there 
is some reason to believe that argument over the significance of exigencies 
and exceptions is simply a prelude to the coming of a conflict of greater im-
portance-an attempt to break off from the long-standing presumption 
that warrantless searches are per se invalid in favor of a practice of judging 
each warrantless search by a general"reasonableness" standard. 12 
On the other side there has been a substantial minority13 on the 
Supreme Court who view the per se rule and the application of exceptions 
(based on the existence of exigent circumstances) as requiring a two-step in-
quiry in each case. They accept the premise, as do their counterparts, that 
circumstances may justify warrantless searches. They also accept the 
premise that the circumstances justifying warrantless searches tend to be 
recurring and create general categories of cases which make possible a 
definitional categorization of exceptions. However, once the facts bring a 
case into one of the general categories of exceptions, they would permit a 
further inquiry into the question of whether the circumstances (exigencies) 
in fact existed in the particular case under consideration. 14 Unlike their 
counterparts, they express no basic disagreement with the fundamental 
concept that warrantless searches are per se invalid. 15 
The disagreement involves, in part, a difference of opinion among 
members of the Court concerning the proper weight to be given the value 
of providing clearly defined guidelines for law enforcement officials in 
fourth amendment decisions. In one sense, those who advocate a restricted 
view of the significance of exigent circumstances and who would refuse a 
case-by-case analysis of circumstances justifying warrantless searches have 
11 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 
(1970) 
12 /d. See also text accompanying notes 81-82 infra. 
13 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall have consistently been at odds with the majori-
ty in a number of recent warrantless search cases. See generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 
(1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
14 Perhaps the clearest articulation of the position of Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Mar-
shall is contained in Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 473-84 (1970). 
JS United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 811 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting); "The 
[majority] says that the relevant question is 'not whether it was unreasonable to procure a search 
warrant, but whether the search itself was reasonable.' Precisely such a view, however, was ex-
plicitly rejected in [Chime/], where the Court characterized the argument as 'founded on little 
more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct' .... " 
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adopted what appears to be a contradictory position. They argue that a 
case-by-case analysis of the existence of exigent circumstances would re-
quire law enforcement officials to make difficult, on-the-spot decisions. 16 
The chances of error in judgment would be ever present, thus the possibili-
ty of exclusion of evidence seized increased in a number of cases. However, 
to the extent they appear to be moving toward a "reasonableness" ap-
proach to decision making, they create an even greater possibility for error 
at the law enforcement level. Under the per se rule, law enforcement of-
ficials were relatively certain that a warrantless search would run into dif-
ficulty unless falling within one of the exceptions. Without a per se rule, 
more warrantless searches may be sustained in the Supreme Court, but the 
negative certainty of the per se rule will be absent. 
Those who stand by the per se rule and who advocate a case-by-case 
approach to warrantless search issues deal with the "need for clarity" 
argument in two ways. First, they reject the contention that definitive 
guidelines for law enforcement officials are a value of overriding 
concern. 17 Second, they contend that the clarity the majority seeks, which 
is apparently in part responsible for the rejection of a case-by-case analysis 
approach, is illusory. Uncertainty will continue to exist, they argue, in such 
fundamental areas as the factual determination of whether, for example, a 
custodial arrest for a traffic offense was effectuated for legitimate reasons 
or, rather, as a pretext for searching the arrestee. 18 
This article will focus on a critical examination of the system of 
analysis of fourth amendment warrant issues that turns on the existence or 
nonexistence of exigent circumstances. The inherent weaknesses of the 
system will be identified with reference to recent Supreme Court decisions. 
The proposition will be advanced that the use of exigent circumstances as 
the touchstone for resolution of fourth amendment warrant issues should 
be discarded, except for a very narrow class of cases. Finally, several alter-
native theories of analysis will be proposed which attempt to balance the 
realistic needs of law enforcement officials with the fundamental value at 
the heart of the fourth amendment-protection of the privacy interest of 
the individual. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the cases, it is instructive to ex-
plore briefly the justification and development of the concept underlying 
the need for "exceptions" in the first instance: that fourth amendment 
16 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,235 (1973). 
17 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 242 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); "The 
majority's fear of overruling the 'quick ad hoc judgment' of the police officer is ... inconsistent 
with the very function of the Amendment-to ensure that the quick ad hoc judgments of the 
police officers are subject to review and control by the judiciary." 
18 /d. 
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values are best preserved by a system that presumptively requires the 
utilization of search warrants except where a good excuse can be found. 
The Warrant Requirement-Foundation 
The underlying basis for the preference for warrants appears to be 
twofold. The first justification relies on a functional interpretation of the 
language of the fourth amendment. 19 The amendment proscribes 
"unreasonable searches and seizures" in one clause and sets forth the 
prerequisites for a valid warrant in the second clause. Those who support 
the position favoring use of warrants contend that if all warrantless 
searches and seizures were judged solely with reference to their 
"reasonableness," there would be no incentive to make use of the warrant 
procedure. Such an interpretation of the fourth amendment, the argument 
concludes, would reduce the warrant clause to surplusage. 20 The second 
argument urged in support of the justification for the preference for war-
rants is really but a corollary of the first. It relates to the function of the 
warrant process itself. The argument assumes that the insertion of an in-
dependent authority, 21 not responsible for ferreting out the criminal ele-
ment, who must pass on the constitutional justification for a search 
(probable cause), will operate as a limitation on the natural temptation for 
law enforcement officials to exceed the scope of their authority. 22 To this 
extent, a system of warrants, which places the independent magistrate in a 
19 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." 
For a discussion of the relationship between the two clauses, see Player, Warrantless 
Searches and Seizures, 6 GA. L. REV. 269 (1971). 
20 White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robin-
son and Matlock, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 165, 172. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,393-94 
(1914). 
21 In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), the Court held that the "issuing 
magistrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of deter-
mining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search." !d. at 350. The Court 
went on to hold that the requisite detachment would be met so long as the magistrate "is removed 
from the prosecutor or police and works within the judicial branch subject to supervision of the .•. 
judge." ld. at 351. In a subsequent case, the Court invalidated a warrant process that paid a 
justice of the peace five dollars for each warrant issued, finding such a system to be at odds with 
the requirement that warrants be issued by a "neutral judicial officer." Connally v. Georgia, 429 
U.S. 245 (1977). Earlier, the Court had invalidated a search warrant issued by the State Attorney 
General (who was in charge of the investigation and later prosecuted the case) because he was ''not 
the neutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 u.s. 443,452 (1970). 
22 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (Jackson, J.): "The point of the 
Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law en-
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position of halting an intrusion before the fact, provides maximum protec-
tion for fourth amendment values. This argument assumes that the exclu-
sionary rule23 is not an adequate safeguard to an individual whose privacy 
has been disturbed without sufficient justification. Because there is no 
satisfactory way to restore the status quo once the intrusion has occurred 
(the exclusionary rule prohibiting only the use of items or information 
unlawfully obtained), every precaution must be taken before the fact to 
assure that sufficient lawful justification for the search exists. 
The dual justification for the preference for warrants is subject to at 
least three valid criticisms. The first relates to a proper interpretation of 
constitutional history. According to Professor Telford Taylor, those "who 
have viewed the Fourth Amendment primarily as a requirement that 
searches be pursuant to warrants have stood the amendment on its 
head. " 24 Professor Taylor argues that the Framers were concerned with 
general warrants and writs of assistance-overreaching warrants-not 
about warrantless searches.25 A strict interpretation of constitutional 
history, he argues, leads to the conclusion that warrantless searches should 
be governed by a "reasonableness" standard. The second valid criticism of 
the preference for warrants relates to its embodiment in all-inclusive 
form-that warrantless searches are per se improper, subject to narrowly 
drawn exceptions based upon the existence of exigent circumstances. There 
is an alternative to a per se rule that would preserve the concept of warrants 
as a limiting factor on police activities. The Court could adopt a position 
that the nonexistence of a warrant in situations where a warrant could have 
been obtained without jeopardizing the safety of the officers or others, or 
realistically risking the possible destruction or loss of the items sought, 
would be a persuasive (rather than conclusive) factor in a finding of 
"unreasonableness. " 26 The final criticism of the preference for warrants is 
based upon a realistic appraisal of the role of the magistrate. The justifica-
tion for encouraging the utilization of the warrant process assumes that the 
forcement the support of those usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its 
protection consists in requiring that the inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime." But see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977): "Once a lawful search has begun, it 
is also far more likely that [the search] will not exceed proper bounds when it is done pursuant to a 
judicial authorization 'particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized.' Further, a warrant assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the 
lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search." 
/d. at 9. 
23 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
24 T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 46-47 (1969). 
2S /d. at 24-41. 
26 See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30,40 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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magistrate operates as a meaningful limitation, that is, one that will halt 
unjustified police intrusions before they occur. The limited empirical 
evidence that exists suggests that the independent magistrate does not ef-
fectively screen the unjustified searches at the warrant application stage. 27 
Historical Development of the Per Se Rule and Exceptions 
It is impossible to identify an individual case where the Supreme 
Court first accepted a definitive position that warrantless searches were per 
se invalid, subject to well-delineated, limited exceptions based on the ex-
istence of exigent circumstances. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, perhaps more 
than any other individual Justice, was responsible for the development of 
the concept of a per se position with respect to warrantless searches. He 
was also primarily responsible for the first clear articulation of the reason-
ing and logic supporting various exceptions to the per se rule. In his strong 
dissents in Harris v. United States28 and United States v. Rabinowitz, 29 
Justice Frankfurter laid the groundwork for the modern approach to war-
rantless search cases. 
Prior to the emergence of the per se rule in the 1960's, and apart from 
the dissenting opinions of Justice Frankfurter, early fourth amendment 
cases involving warrantless searches appear to have been decided by the cir-
cuitous process of defining categories of cases based on the extrinsic fac-
tual setting of the search where a warrantless search would be viewed as 
presumptively valid. By a process of exclusion, having exhausted 
categories of cases where warrantless searches were permitted, the Court 
appears to have backed into the position that all other searches would be 
viewed as invalid when undertaken without warrant. It is somewhat 
27 Miller & Tiffeny, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current 
Practices, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. I. One commentator has stated: "What empirical studies are 
available suggest that the Court's oft-stated preference for warrants is based more upon myth than 
fact. Arrest warrants are commonly issued in the absence of any meaningful participation by a 
judicial officer." Lafave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into 
the"Quagmire", 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 27 (1972). 
A rejoinder suggested by another commentator would, nevertheless, support the warrant 
process because of the following factors: First, one desirable effect of the warrant process is to 
freeze the story of the affiant well ahead of the search or arrest. Second, it is by no means realistic 
to assume that magistrates are never "independent" and, to the extent they are, certain imper-
missible intrusions will be prevented. Third, to the extent the magistrate is committed to the police 
view of the criminal process, he still has a valid function to play: to advance the ultimate success of 
the intrusion by taking pains to see that the requirements of the warrant clause are met. Finally, to 
require the officer to have a warrant is to remain at least that symbolic step away from the police 
state. White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson 
and Matlock, 1974 SuP. CT. Rev. 165, 181 n.34. 
28 331 u.s. 145, 155 (1947). 
29 339 u.s. 56, 68 (1950). 
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strange that the Court did not initially adopt a posture which would justify 
this type of inquiry, that is, that the nonexistence of a warrant was a 
decisive factor in each case unless a valid excuse could be found. This pro-
cess of viewing warrantless searches with regard to the extrinsic setting is 
probably attributable in part to the manner in which the first serious 
challenge to a warrantless search was decided by the Court-the case of 
Weeks v. United States. 30 
In Weeks there was little discussion concerning the proper relation-
ship between the "reasonableness" clause of the fourth amendment and 
the amendment's requirements regarding warrants. Instead, the Court 
viewed the case with reference to the extrinsic factual setting of the activity 
from the point of view of what kind of case it was, as well as what kind of 
case it was not. Thus Mr. Justice Day's articulation of the issue in the 
following terms: 
What, then, is the present case? Before answering that inquiry specifically, it 
may be well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not. It is not an asser-
tion of the right on the part of the Government always recognized under 
English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally 
arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime .... The case in 
the aspect in which we are dealing with it involves the right of the court in a 
criminal prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence the letters and 
correspondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence and without 
his authority, by a United States Marshal holding no warrant for his arrest 
and none for the search of the premises.31 
The process of definitional categorization of cases based on the ex-
trinsic setting in which the warrantless search took place was continued ten 
years later in Carroll v. United States. 32 Carroll involved the constitu-
tionality of an act of Congress purporting to validate warrantless seizures 
of contraband liquor in the process of being transported by automobile or 
other means of conveyance. The Court phrased the issue in Carroll in 
terms of whether it was consistent with the fourth amendment for 
Congress to distinguish between the necessity of a warrant in the 
"searching of private dwellings and in that of automobiles and other road 
vehicles.'m Concluding that the fourth amendment prohibited only 
"unreasonable" searches and seizures, the Court went on to find a con-
stitutional difference 
between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of 
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a 
30 232 u.s. 383 (1914). 
31 /d. at 392-93. 
32 267 u.s. 132 ( 1925). 
33 /d. at 147. 
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ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile ... where it is not practicable to secure 
a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or 
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 34 
The status of the scope and meaning of the fourth amendment immediately 
following Carroll can be summarized as follows: Warrantless searches of 
the person following arrest were lawful. Support for this proposition was 
the right "always recognized" under English and American law. War-
rantless searches of automobiles and other means of conveyance were also 
lawful, although the justification was somewhat unclear. It is not at all 
unreasonable to read Carroll as resting in part on a perceived difference of 
constitutional significance between the inherent values of the fourth 
amendment regarding the sanctity of a man's home as opposed to his 
automobile. This reasoning, which might in modern times be described as 
some inherent concept of a greater right of privacy in one's home, has 
recently played a significant role in automobile search cases, as will be 
more fully developed later.35 However, it is also clear that the modern cases 
rely in part on the "mobility" aspects of the reasoning set forth in Carroll 
as the justification for permitting a warrantless search of an automobile. 36 
Finally, after Carroll it was reasonable to assume that a warrantless search 
of a dwelling would be viewed as per se unlawful. 
In 1925, the Court decided a case, Agnello v. United States, 37 which 
represented a major turning point in the development of search and seizure 
doctrine. In Agnello, the Court reaffirmed a principle first set forth in 
Weeks, namely, that standing alone, a warrantless search of a dwelling 
would be presumptively unlawful. More importantly, however, the Court 
in Agnello made three other significant points. First, the Court recognized 
an exception to the general proposition that a dwelling may not be lawfully 
searched without a warrant. The Court stated: "[I)t has always been 
assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search 
warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein. " 38 
The second major point set forth in Agnello related to the practical 
justification for the right to search incident to arrest: "to find and seize 
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was 
committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from 
custody .... " 39 The final point made in Agnello was that the right to search 
incident to arrest had a temporal and/ or geographic limitation. 40 The exact 
34 /d. at 153. 
3S See text accompanying note 130 infra. 
36 See text accompanying note 141 infra. 
37 269 u.s. 20 ( 1925). 
38 Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
39 /d. at 30. 
40 /d. at 30-31. 
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nature of the limitation was unclear in Agnello because the search in ques-
tion was not of the dwelling where the arrest took place and was effec-
tuated at a time when "the conspiracy was ended and the defendants were 
under arrest and in custody elsewhere. " 41 The Court did not purport to 
link the articulated justification for the right to search incident to arrest 
to the limitation announced. Thus, following Agnello, it was uncertain as 
to the basis for the geographic and/ or temporal limitation of the right to 
search incident to arrest. One possible explanation for the limitation would 
be that the right to search a dwelling without a warrant incident to arrest 
was tied directly to a lawful entry in the first instance. If the police had a 
right to enter without a warrant to effectuate an arrest, a further intrusion 
in the nature of a search of the dwelling was simply not of constitutional 
significance. When the arrest did not take place in a dwelling, there was no 
lawful justification for entry in the first instance. The limitation in Agnello 
can also be explained with reference to the justification for the right to 
search incident to arrest, namely, that exigencies in the nature of an im-
mediate need to search for weapons and evidence dispense with the need 
for a warrant. Those exigencies do not exist with respect to locations far 
removed from the place where the arrest takes place nor do they exist at a 
time following arrest when the accused is safely in custody. Thus, the 
justification for the right to search also operated to limit the temporal and 
geographic scope of the right. 
Beginning in 1947, under the leadership of Justice Frankfurter, the 
Court began the final step toward the articulation of a per se rule. In 
Harris v. United States,42 a 5-4 majority of the Court upheld the war-
rantless search of a four-room dwelling under the rationale that the of-
ficers, having properly arrested the defendant on the premises, were en-
titled to search the entire premises under the defendant's control.43 Harris, 
of course, represented the high-water mark of the scope and intensity of 
the search incident to arrest exception.44 The majority opinion contributed 
little to the direction of fourth amendment decisions other than an expan-
sive reading of the scope of the right to search incident to arrest. The 
Harris decision was significant, however, because of the strong dissent of 
Justice Frankfurter. After tracing the constitutional history leading to the 
passage of the fourth amendment, Frankfurter concluded that the 
"unreasonableness" prohibition of the amendment was not enacted to 
provide a standard under which particular searches were to be judged. 45 In-
41 /d. at31. 
42 331 u.s. 145 (1947). 
43 /d. at 151. 
44 See text accompanying note 73 infra. 
4S Harrisv. UnitedStates,331 U.S.145,162(1947). 
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stead, he argued that "unreasonableness" had to be viewed in the context 
of the "reason" for the adoption of the amendment, namely, "with minor 
and severely confined exceptions, inferentially a part of the Amendment, 
every search and seizure is unreasonable when made without a magistrate's 
authority expressed through a validly issued warrant. " 46 Later in his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter expounded on the nature of those 
"minor and severely confined exceptions": 
The only exceptions to the safeguard of a warrant. .. are those which the com-
mon law recognized as inherent limitations of the policy which found expres-
sion in the Fourth Amendment-where circumstances preclude the obtaining 
of a warrant (as in the case of movable vehicles), and where the warrant for 
the arrest of a person carries with it authority to seize all that is on the per-
son, or is in such open and immediate physical relation to him as to be in a 
fair sense, a projection of his person. 47 
The nature of Frankfurter's dissent is significant. He apparently viewed 
the search in Harris as unlawful not because the particular search extended 
in scope and intensity beyond the limits of any exigency inherent in the cir-
cumstances of lawful arrest, but because of a more general philosophy that 
search incident to arrest unlimited in scope and intensity would effectively 
eliminate any protection afforded by the warrant process. Lawful entry in 
the first instance, he argued, could not be used as a predicate for further 
unrestrained rummaging through private papers and effects.48 At this 
point, Frankfurter had not articulated any specific justification of the right 
to the search incident to arrest. No mention was made in the dissent of the 
exigency of the need to search for weapons or to search for evidence within 
immediate control of the accused so as to prevent its destruction. On the 
other hand, Frankfurter's one reference to the lawfulness of a warrantless 
automobile search is obviously based on the urgency of the situation. 
Frankfurter further expanded on this theory, dissenting three years 
later in United States v. Rabinowitz. 49 In Rabinowitz, Frankfurter for the 
first time made it clear that his view of the right to search incident to arrest 
was an exception based upon necessity. The necessity, according to Justice 
Frankfurter, was twofold: "[F]irst, in order to protect the arresting officer 
46 /d. (emphasis added). 
47 Id. at 168. 
48 Id. at 164. 
49 339 U.S. 56 (I 950). In Rabinowitz, the defendant was arrested at his place of business 
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. Following the arrest, the officers searched the one-room office 
for about an hour and a half. In upholding the search as valid because incident to the arrest, the 
majority held that it was not "unreasonable" for officers to search the entire premises under the 
control of the person arrested. /d. at 61. 
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and to deprive the prisoner of potential means of escape ... and, secondly, 
to avoid destruction of evidence by the arrested person."50 Justice 
Frankfurter went on to use the necessity justifying the right to limit the in-
tensity and scope of the right-only the person and "those immediate 
physical surroundings which may fairly be deemed to be an extension of his 
person'' could be lawfully searched without a warrant. 51 
On the more general right to search without a warrant, Justice 
Frankfurter was even more emphatic in arguing that warrants were re-
quired except when there was "good excuse" for not getting one. 52 The ex-
istence of an opportunity to obtain a warrant was a relevant factor in every 
case, according to Frankfurter.53 Frankfurter's reference in Rabinowitz to 
the relevance of police "opportunity to secure a warrant" was, of course, 
directly rejected by the majority opinion. 54 
It is instructive at this point to examine a series of three cases decided 
by the Court during the time span between Harris in 1947 and Rabinowitz 
in 1950. The three cases emphasize the struggle within the Court during this 
period to develop consistency with respect to fourth amendment warrant 
principles. 
In Johnson v. United States,S5 a 5-4 majority invalidated the war-
rantless search of a dwelling in an opinion in which Mr. Justice Jackson in-
dicated that only "exceptional circumstances" would suffice to dispense 
with the need for a warrant. 56 Without any detailed explanation or authori-
ty, Justice Jackson identified three situations that would meet such a stan-
dard: (1) a suspect fleeing or likely to take flight; (2) the search of a 
movable vehicle; and (3) when the items sought were threatened with 
removal or destruction. 57 Later the same year Mr. Justice Douglas, writing 
the majority opinion in McDonald v. United States,S8 invalidated a war-
rantless search of a dwelling, reiterating the holding in Johnson that "ex-
ceptional circumstances" were the only basis for by-passing the warrant 
so !d. at72. 
51 !d. at 72-73. 
52 /d. at 83. 
53 !d. at 84. 
54 !d. at 65-66. 
55 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In Johnson, the police made a warrantless entry into the defendant's 
room. Although the majority opinion acknowledged that the police might have had information 
sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant, they nevertheless invalidated the search on 
grounds that no reason was offered for not obtaining a warrant except the inconvenience to the of-
ficers and the slight delay necessary to prepare the papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. 
/d. at 12-15. 
56 !d. at 14-15. 
57 /d. at 15. 
sa 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
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process. 59 The majority opinion added nothing to Justice Jackson's vague 
articulation of the kind of cases that would fit within such a definition. 
Justice Douglas' opinion in McDonald did, however, touch on one point 
of significance, a point raised by Justice Frankfurter's earlier dissent in 
Harris. In support of the Court's holding that "exceptional cir-
cumstances" were not present, Justice Douglas specifically referred to the 
absence of facts in the record showing that the delay inherent in use of the 
warrant process would have jeopardized the efficacy of the search. 60 
The point raised by Justice Douglas in McDonald was obvious. If the 
validity of warrantless searches was to be determined with reference to con-
cepts of necessity and urgency, the Court had to define the time frame that 
would be examined in deciding whether such circumstances existed in any 
particular case. It is obvious that in every case the instant immediately 
preceding the search could be viewed by reasonable men to justify a sense 
of urgency given the fact that suspects or occupants of the premises or 
vehicles to be searched are alerted to the presence and intent of the police. 
In many cases, however, the police might have had an opportunity to 
secure a warrant without necessarily jeopardizing the efficacy of the 
search, in which case, the necessity or urgency at the instant immediately 
preceding the search would be a police-created emergency. 
It was on this point that the Court had, prior to McDonald, decided 
the much maligned case of Trupiano v. United States. 61 Although 
Trupiano was quickly overruled by Rabinowitz, 62 it did raise and decide 
the very point (albeit in different form) which was to continue to plague the 
Court for the next twenty-five years. It is significant to recall that at the 
time Trupiano was decided there had only been vague reference in prior 
cases to the concept that warrantless searches were per se improper absent 
exceptional circumstances.63 In addition, the search incident to arrest con-
cept at the time of Trupiano had been given a very expansive reading in 
Harris with respect to the geographic scope of the search right. 64 The Court 
in Trupiano faced squarely the issue of the relationship between what was 
later to be specifically defined as the foundation for the right to search inci-
dent to arrest-the need for prompt action-and the factual reality in the 
individual case under consideration by the Court. For in Trupiano it was 
clear that the police had ample opportunity to secure a search warrant 
S9 !d. at 454. 
60 !d. at 455. 
61 334 u.s. 699 (1948). 
62 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). "To the extent (Trupiano) requires a 
search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than upon the 
reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case is overruled." /d. at 66. 
63 See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra. 
64 See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
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prior to entry for purposes of effectuating the arrest. 65 The Court in 
Trupiano concluded that even though the entry for the purpose of making 
a warrantless arrest was lawful, the entry for such purpose could not serve 
as the basis for a subsequent search incident to arrest when it was prac-
ticable to secure a search warrant beforehand. 66 The significance of 
Trupiano was that such limitation applied, even though the scope of the 
search was within spatial limits, as then defined, of the right to search inci-
dent to arrest.67 The issue of factual reality versus perceived generalizations 
concerning the need for haste had been faced in Trupiano and resolved in 
favor of the accused. 
The holding of Trupiano, of course, has never been revived. 68 
However, the impact of the Court's rejection of the reasoning of the 
Trupiano majority, together with the acceptance of a per se rule (with ex-
ceptions based upon the existence of exigent circumstances), has led, in 
part, to the difficulty the Court faces today in attempting to achieve a con-
sistent (and logical) approach to warrantless search issues. The Court has 
come to accept the premise that warrantless searches are per se unlawful 
unless occurring in circumstances (defined with reference to the factual set-
ting of the search) in which the need for prompt action is present. The key 
to a consistent and logical solution to cases under such an approach is ob-
vious: the exigency must exist in fact and should not be an exigency created 
by the action (or inaction) of the government. However, the Court con-
tinues to reject relevant factual considerations essential to sound analysis. 
The Court has refused to inquire into whether the police, prior to the 
search, could have obtained a warrant without realistically jeopardizing 
the safety of the officers or others or without risking the loss or destruction 
of evidence. The Court has further undermined the logic of the cases by 
refusing a case-by-case analysis of one additional important factual con-
sideration. Without regard to whether the police, prior to the search, could 
have obtained a warrant, a majority of the current Court also has refused 
to examine whether the circumstances at the time of the search in fact 
justified the need for prompt action. Thus, the concept of "exigent cir-
cumstances" is totally without meaning-neither the conduct of the police 
prior to the search nor the facts at the time of the search are relevant. The 
following analysis of the recent cases demonstrates the intellectual 
weakness of the current approach to warrantless search issues. 
65 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699,703 (1948). 
66 /d. at 709. 
67 Id. at 707-708. 
68 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,482 (1970). 
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The difficulty with the modern approach to cases began with the case 
of Chime! v. California. 69 Chime! was a critical case in th~ development of 
current fourth amendment principles because of what it had to say con-
cerning the foundation (and limitation) of the right to search incident to ar-
rest. For the first time, a majority of the Court clearly and unequivocally 
linked the search incident to arrest exception to something other than "the 
right. .. always recognized under English and American law .... " 70 In 
Chime!, the Court took the position that the right to search incident to ar-
rest was grounded in the more general philosophy that the police must, 
"whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval" for the search. 71 
In addition, the Court limited the scope of the right to "the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible. " 72 In the case of a search incident 
to arrest, Chime! held that it was reasonable for the arresting officer, 
without a warrant, to search the person of the accused and the area within 
his immediate control in order "to remove any weapons that the latter 
might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape," and to pre-
vent "concealment or destruction" of evidence. 73 
The questions left unanswered by the Chime! decision were obvious. 
How was the Court going to deal with cases involving arrests for offenses 
not involving evidence that could be concealed on or about the person of 
the accused or arrests for minor offenses not normally involving any 
realistic fear for the safety of the arresting officer? In addition, how strict-
ly was the Court going to construe the temporal limitation of Chimen If a 
search of the person was based upon the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances, would a search of the person of the accused (or the area within 
his immediate control at the time of his arrest) long after the arrest be valid 
when undertaken without a warrant? 
The 1973-74 term of the Court produced answers to the questions, 
but in a manner that is difficult to reconcile with a theory which gives 
meaningful content to a system of exigent circumstances as the justifica-
tion for a warrantless search incident to arrest. In United States v. 
(1968). 
69 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
70 Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383,392 (1914). See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
71 Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I 
72 /d. 
73 /d. at 763. 
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Robinson14 and its companion case of Gustafson v. Florida,15 the Court 
was presented with the issue of the scope of the search incident to arrest ex-
ception in the context of arrests for traffic offenses. Given the Chime] 
justification for warrantless searches incident to arrest, the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals in Robinson held that a limited form of intru-
sion, similar to the "frisk" type of search permitted in Terry v. Ohio,16 
was the only form of intrusion consistent with the limited exigent cir-
cumstances presented in the case of a custodial arrest for a traffic offense. 
The position of the court of appeals was predicated on the assumption that 
traffic offenses do not involve tangible evidence of the type that would be 
located on or about the person of the accused; therefore, a fortiori, there 
would be no legitimate exigency in the nature of probable destruction of 
evidence when the custodial arrest took place. However, Chime] also 
justified the warrantless search incident to arrest on the grounds of the 
need to discover weapons on or about the person of the accused which 
might be used against the arresting officer. It would not have been im-
plausible for the court of appeals to have held that a fear of weapons in the 
case of routine traffic arrest was simply an exaggerated fear, insufficient to 
support an unlimited search right in all such cases. However, the court of 
appeals in Robinson instead held that a limited form of intrusion in the 
nature of a Terry type of "frisk" would have been sufficient to discover 
weapons,77 representing a reasonable compromise between the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement officials and the privacy of the individual. 
The majority opinion in Robinson rejected the reasoning of the court 
of appeals and permitted a full search of the person in any case involving a 
"lawful custodial arrest."78 Unfortunately, the basis of the majority o-
pinion is less than clear. The majority in Robinson apparently found three 
primary faults with the arguments advanced. First, on a general level, they 
rejected the proposition that a defendant should be permitted to argue 
"whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the 
authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest. " 79 Ac-
cording to the majority, neither the constitutional history of the right to 
search incident to arrest, nor a realistic appraisal of the situation facing a 
police officer at the time of arrest could support such a position. 80 Second, 
74 414 U.S. 218 (1973). For a discussion of many of the problems raised by the Robinson 
decision, see La Fave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedure," 1974 
SuP. CT. REv.127. 
1S 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
76 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
77 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
78 /d. at 238; 414 U.S. 260,266 (1973). 
79 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,235 (1973). 
80 /d. 
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the majority in Robinson apparently retreated somewhat from the position 
taken in Chime/ with respect to the justification for the right to search inci-
dent to arrest. Although they did not reject outright the holding in Chime/ 
that a warrantless search incident to arrest was an "exception" to the 
general per se rule, it did make it clear that the reasoning supporting the 
right was not solely one of the existence of "exigent circumstances. " 81 
According to the majority, "[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on 
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment," 
that is, it "is not only an exception to the warrant requirement ... but is also 
a reasonable search under that Amendment. " 82 Finally, the majority re-
jected any implication that the nature of the offense for which the defen-
dant is arrested should govern the right to search or the scope thereof. 
Specifically, dealing with that aspect of Chime/ which dealt with the need 
to disarm the defendant, the majority rejected as "speculative" the argu-
ment that persons arrested for minor, unspecified offenses, are unlikely to 
be armed. 83 In addition, the Court rejected the argument that a "Terry" 
frisk would serve to protect the officer in such cases. The limited intrusion 
in the nature of a frisk, said the Court, was based on the absence of pro-
bable cause to arrest and would not be applied to situations where a 
custodial arrest had occurred. 84 
Thus, the majority in Robinson took a significant step in the direc-
tion of condemning the significance of exigent circumstances in the context 
of searches incident to arrest. Not only did they justify the right on alter-
native grounds (a "reasonable" warrantless intrusion), but they also re-
jected any attempt to limit the extent of the right commensurate with the 
exigencies facing the arresting officer in any particular case. 
Later the same term, the Court decided the case of United States v. 
Edwards. 85 Edwards involved the warrantless seizure of clothing worn by 
the defendant at the time of his arrest. The seizure of the clothing took 
place ten hours after the arrest at a time when the administrative processing 
of the arrest had been completed and the defendant was in full custody of 
the police.86 The defendant argued that to support the seizure as one inci-
dent to arrest would be in direct conflict with prior holdings of the Court 
fixing a temporal limitation on the right. Although Chime/ did not deal 
directly with the extent of a temporal limitation, an earlier case, Stoner v. 
81 Id. 
82 !d. (emphasis added). 
83 !d. at 234. 
84 !d. at 227, 234-35. 
85 415U.S. 800(1974). 
86 Id. at 801-802. 
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California,81 had held that a search incident to arrest had to be, as to tim-
ing, "substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. " 88 The Court, in a 6-
3 decision, rejected the contentions of the defendant in Edwards and 
upheld the seizure. 
The majority opinion in Edwards, written by Mr. Justice White, 
focused on the "reasonableness" of the police actions. In essence, the ma-
jority argued that the seizure ten hours following arrest was simply a 
reasonable extension of what might have occurred at the time of arrest. To 
the extent there was an intrusion into the personal effects of the defendant, 
it was no greater than that which could have lawfully taken place at the 
time of arrest. 89 
Four members of the Court dissented in Edwards. 90 Three, Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, also dissented in Robinson and 
Gustafson. They were joined by Mr. Justice Stewart who wrote the dis-
senting opinion. The dissenters in Edwards disagreed with the majority in 
two respects. First, they argued that the ten-hour delay negated any claim 
that the seizure of the clothing was incident to arrest. According to Justice 
Stewart, "the police had ample time to seek a warrant, and no exigent cir-
cumstances were present to excuse their failure to do so. " 91 
Second, on a more general level, the dissenters rejected the majority's 
alternate ground in upholding the search on the finding of "reason-
ableness." Such an approach, said the dissenting opinion, was explicitly re-
jected in Chime/ where the Court characterized the argument as "founded 
on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain 
sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to fourth 
amendment interests.' '92 
The Edwards decision takes on special significance when viewed in 
conjunction with the decisions in Robinson and Gustafson. In Robinson 
and Gustafson, the defendants challenged the existence of exigencies at the 
time of arrest. There was no allegation that the police might have first 
secured a warrant without jeopardizing the efficacy of the search.93 
87 376 U.S. 483 (1964). In Stoner the police entered the defendant's hotel room during his 
absence, having obtained purported "consent" for the entry from the hotel clerk. Id. at 484-85. 
Incriminating evidence was seized and the defendant was arrested two days later in another state. 
The Court rejected the lower court's finding that the search was lawful as incident to arrest, the 
lower court having extended the right to search incident to arrest to include instances where police 
made entry into premises to effectuate an arrest (even though the person sought was not found). 
88 I d. at 486. 
89 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800,805 (1974). 
90 I d. at 809. 
91 I d. at 811. 
92 Id. 
93 See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text. 
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Edwards, on the other hand, involved a case where the exigency of possible 
destruction of evidence was real, as an abstract proposition, but the actions 
of the police in delaying the seizure for ten hours following the arrest 
dissipated any claim of urgency. In addition, the ten-hour delay could have 
been used to secure a warrant. To the extent an exigency still existed at the 
time of the seizure ten hours following the arrest, it was one created by the 
police by their failure to secure a warrant. 
Following the decisions in Robinson, Gustafson, and Edwards, the 
basis and scope of the search incident to arrest exception might be sum-
marized as follows: In all cases involving a custodial arrest, the police may 
search (subject to the spatial limitations of Chime/) without a warrant. The 
basis of the right may be found in the nature of the exigencies facing the ar-
resting officers (they may always presume that the accused is armed), as 
well as in the "reasonableness" of their actions. Once the custodial arrest 
takes place, no significant constitutional issue is presented if the search (at 
least of the person) takes place several hours later. Therefore, the existence 
of exigent circumstances affects, in fact, neither the existence of the right 
in the first instance, nor limitations on the temporal scope of the right (at 
least in the respect approved in Edwards). 
Automobile Searches 
The automobile search cases follow the same general pattern as the 
search incident to arrest cases. The first contemporary automobile search 
case was decided in 1970, one year after Chime/. In Chambers v. 
Maroney/4 Justice White, writing for the majority, held that prior cases of 
the Court had established that an automobile or other form of conveyance 
could be searched without a warrant, provided there was probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contained items subject to seizure. 95 It is clear 
from a reading of the prior cases that the "fleeting" nature of the target of 
the search served as the primary basis for upholding the warrantless 
search.96 Although it is possible to read the Court's early opinions dealing 
with warrantless automobile searches as resting in part on the premise that 
an automobile is not given the same fourth amendment protection as is the 
case with one's home,97 the Court had never, prior to Chambers, expressly 
held that the exception to the warrant requirement was grounded in such a 
philosophy. 
94 399 u.s. 42 (1970). 
9s !d. at 48-49. 
96 See text accompanying note 34 supra. See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 
(1931). 
97 See text accompanying note 35 supra. 
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Given the fact that the "mobile" nature of the target of the search 
served as the practical rationalization for exception, it would not have been 
implausible for the defendants in Chambers to have argued that the search 
was invalid because the factual basis for the exception was lacking in their 
particular case. The defendants in Chambers had been arrested while in the 
automobile alleged to have been used as the get-away car.98 The 
automobile was seized and taken to the police station. In the course of a 
search of the automobile at the station, "sometime after the arrest," in-
criminating evidence was seized. 99 The defendants might have realistically 
contended that the automobile, being in the possession of the police, was 
no longer a "fleeting" target and thus there was no justification for by-
passing the magistrate on the question of probable cause to search. One of 
the difficulties with such an argument would be, of course, that it would 
require the Court to separate the police activity into two separate transac-
tions: the seizure of the automobile from the open road (clearly a fourth 
amendment activity) followed by a search of the automobile (also clearly a 
fourth amendment activity). Justice White's·response to such an argument 
was as follows: 
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the 
immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is ob-
tained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the 
magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which is 
the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question .... For constitutional 
purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding 
a car before presenting the probable cause issue to the magistrate and on the 
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. 100 
Left unanswered by Justice White's opinion in Chambers was 
whether there were any circumstances in which an automobile would not 
be a "fleeting" target. Although he specifically mentioned the possibility 
that there might be such cases, 101 he gave no insight into what cir-
cumstances would call for the use of the traditional warrant requirement in 
cases involving the search of an automobile. The only possible alternative 
to an immediate search without a warrant, following the automobile until a 
warrant was obtained, was discounted by Justice White as impracticable 
and raising the distinct possibility of destruction of evidence. 102 
98 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,44 (1970). 
99 /d. at47. 
100 /d. at 51-52. 
101 /d. at 50. ("Neither [Carroll) nor other cases in the Court require or suggest that in 
every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made 
without ... a warrant .... " 
102 /d. at 51 n.9. 
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It is significant to view the decision in Chambers in the light of 
Edwards. The two cases are remarkably similar on the surface, even 
though they involve different exceptions to the warrant requirement. Both 
cases involve an attack on the exigencies inherent in the situation facing the 
police immediately preceding the challenged fourth amendment activity. In 
both cases, the defendants would have had difficulty in maintaining, given 
the current state of the law, that the activities of the police were invalid had 
they occurred at some prior point in time. 103 In Chambers, presumably the 
search of the automobile would have been valid had it taken place on the 
highway following arrest. In Edwards, the seizure of the clothing worn by 
the defendant would also have been valid had it occurred at the time of the 
arrest. However, in both cases, the police delayed the fourth amendment 
activity challenged and thus raised substantial doubt as to the validity of 
such actions. In Chambers, a majority of the members of the Court re-
fused to limit the extent and nature of the intrusion consistent with the cir-
cumstances which gave rise to the need to proceed without a warrant, that 
is, to limit the warrantless activity to seizure (immobilization and protec-
tion) only. Instead, the majority in Chambers permitted a full warrantless 
search even though the exigency had been fully dissipated by subsequent 
events. 
In Edwards, the same philosophy was used to validate seizure of the 
clothing. The majority argued that seizure of the clothing at the time of the 
arrest would have been valid pursuant to the authority granted under the 
search incident to arrest exception104 (the exigency being satisfied, 
presumably, on the ground that the clothing could have been destroyed by 
the defendant). Because the seizure of the clothing at the time of the arrest 
would have been valid, no significant constitutional issue was presented by 
a delay of several hours. 
The cases, however, involve two major subtle differences, and it is 
the Court's failure to analyze and resolve such differences that emphasizes 
the weakness of the single system of analysis of warrantless searches based 
on the existence of exigent circumstances. First, in Chambers, Justice 
White understandably had difficulty distinguishing, for purposes of the 
fourth amendment, between a warrantless "seizure" of the automobile 
pending the issuance of a search warrant and an immediate search on the 
scene. Unless one is willing to accept the proposition that the warrantless 
seizure of the automobile was justified, but that the subsequent warrantless 
search was not (on the theory that once control was obtained no genuine 
exigency existed to justify the further intrusion in the form of the search), 
103 See text accompanying note 73 supra. 
104 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974). 
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then the argument previously advanced is without merit. Indeed, if the 
argument is accepted, all automobile search cases could be decided by 
similar reasoning. If the police have authority to make the warrantless 
seizure of the automobile and maintain custody pending issuance of a war-
rant, and if one views such activity as a "lesser" violation of the fourth 
amendment, under what theory could an immediate search on the highway 
ever be justified? In other words, most automobile cases involve a seizure 
followed by a search. In the theory advanced, exigencies might justify war-
rantless seizures, but never could they justify warrantless searches. 
The application of such reasoning to the situation in Edwards is 
possible, but only because of the uncommon nature of that case. Search in-
cident to arrest cases by definition almost always involve a seizure of the 
person, followed by a search of the person, followed by a seizure of the 
items found. The warrantless seizure of the "thing" (a person) to be 
searched cannot be viewed as the equivalent of the warrantless seizure of 
an automobile because the Court has expressly held that the preference for 
warrants is not applicable to seizures of the person (arrests). 105 In addition, 
an automobile, unlike a human being, is not capable of destroying 
evidence, so that immobilization (seizure) of the thing (a person) does not, 
in itself, prevent the destruction of evidence. 
In Edwards, however, there was a seizure of the person, followed by 
a seizure of clothing (not requiring an intrusion in the nature of a search), 
followed by an intrusion in the form of a microscopic examination of the 
item seized. The automobile search analysis previously set forth would be 
applicable at the stage where the police obtained control over the item (the 
clothing) to be "searched" and would require the police to submit to a 
magistrate the question of probable cause to believe the clothing contained 
evidence of criminal activity. In the normal search incident to arrest case 
there would have to be a search prior to the time the police could obtain 
"control" over the situation. Immobilization of the thing (a person) in the 
normal search incident to arrest case would not, therefore, serve as a possi-
ble alternative to achieve the objective of limiting the police to a "lesser" 
intrusion on fourth amendment values (seizure only) pending the deter-
mination of the magistrate of the grounds (probable cause) for the 
"greater" intrusion (the search). Because of the uncommon nature of the 
Edwards case, however, the "immobilization" theory could have been 
utilized. 
The Edwards case is different in one other subtle respect. The defen-
dant in Edwards had control over the item seized and searched for at least 
ten hours following arrest. If an exigency existed for the seizure, it is very 
lOS Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
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difficult to credit because of the delay. In Chambers, however, no 
equivalent delay occurred. In other words, in Edwards, unlike Chambers, 
negation of the exigency was created by police inaction from the time they 
came into contact with the item (when seizure, presumably, would have 
been valid). 
The Court's next major case dealing with the extent and scope of the 
automobile exception, in 1971, was Coolidge v. New Hampshire} 06 Once 
again, the Court split on the significance of the exigencies present. In 
Coolidge, the defendant's automobile was seized from the driveway of his 
home after he had been taken into custody .107 According to Justice 
Stewart, the police had known for several days prior to the arrest and 
seizure the probable role of the automobile in the crime and the fact that it 
might contain probative evidence. 108 The delay in effectuating the seizure 
of the automobile provided, according to Justice Stewart, ample op-
portunity for the defendant to have destroyed the evidence, 109 thus 
dissipating the government's argument of the need to act promptly . 110 In 
addition, the fact that the police had secured the premises (the defendant 
was in custody and his wife told that she had to leave) negated the theory 
that the automobile would be moved pending issuance of the warrant. 111 
The principal thesis of the plurality opinion was that unless an 
automobile is to be viewed a talisman "in whose presence the fourth 
amendment fades away," 112 there were no circumstances present to turn 
this case into one where it was "not practicable to secure a warrant. " 113 
Chambers was distinguished by Justice Stewart as a case where the initial 
search "on the highway" would have been permitted; accordingly, there 
was little difference between the search on the highway and a later search at 
the station. 114 The Coolidge case was described by Justice Stewart as in-
volving the question of whether the "initial" intrusion was permitted. 115 
Ample prior opportunity to secure a warrant plus the absence of any com-
pelling circumstances suggesting that the automobile might be moved led 
Justice Stewart to the conclusion that the warrantless seizure of the 
automobile could not be sustained. 
Five members of the Court refused to accept Justice Stewart's restric-
106 /d. 
107 /d. at 448. 
1os /d. at 460. 
109 /d. 
110 /d. 
Ill /d. at 460-61. 
112 I d. at 461. 
113 Jd. at462, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
114 /d. at 463. 
115 /d. at 463 n.20. 
1978] WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 133 
tive reading of the automobile search exception. The respective dissenting 
opinions of Justices Black and White emphasize the current division of 
thinking on the Court concerning the proper role to be given the existence 
or nonexistence of exigent circumstances in any given case. 
Justice Black's opinion rejected the reasoning of the plurality opinion 
as resting on two faulty assumptions. The first was that the police could 
have had the automobile "placed under guard and, thereby, rendered 
immobile." 116 Such reasoning, Justice Black argued, had been rejected in 
Chambers. 117 The second problem Justice Black had with the plurality 
opinion was that it was based on the fact that the defendant was in 
custody, and his wife told that she had to leave the scene and could not use 
the automobile. Justice Black rejected the reasoning as resting on the faul-
ty assumption that the police could keep the wife under "house arrest" and 
the further unreasonable assumption that there was no one else with a 
motivation to alter or remove the automobile. 118 What Justice Black did 
not discuss was why the police might have rightly assumed that the 
evidence would be destroyed in this case, or why, more generally, the fear 
of destruction in the case of a proposed automobile search is greater than 
where the police propose to search a dwelling. 
Justice White's dissenting opinion also focused on the plurality's at-
tempt to distinguish the exigencies inherent in a situation where an 
automobile is parked and the occupants in custody from the situation when 
an automobile is stopped on the open highway. According to Justice 
White, such is a "metaphysical distinction without roots in the com-
monsense standard of reasonableness governing search and seizure 
cases." 119 He further suggested that in the interest of coherence and 
credibility, the Court should "either overrule ... prior cases and treat 
automobiles precisely as we do houses or apply those cases to readily 
movable as well as moving vehicles .... " 120 
The various opinions in Coolidge are significant in the sense that they 
represent the entire philosophical range of thinking regarding the 
significance of exigent circumstances as an integral part of the fourth 
amendment's warrant clause. Justice Stewart's opinion reflects a position 
that attempts a case-by-case analysis of whether the facts support a conclu-
sion of the need for prompt action on the part of law enforcement of-
ficials. His analysis of the facts in Coolidge led to the conclusion that they 
116 /d. at 504. 
117 !d. 
118 !d. at 504-505. 
119 !d. at 527. 
120 !d. Mr. Justice White agreed that Chambers was inapposite given the fact that the 
search in Coolidge occurred many months following the seizure. 403 U.S. 443,523 (1971). 
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were either not exceptional in fact or if they were, the need for prompt ac-
tion was created by inaction on the part of law enforcement officials in not 
securing a warrant prior to the planned seizure. 
Justice Black's opinion, on the other hand, does not seriously at-
tempt to examine the circumstances of the seizure for the existence of ex-
igencies necessitating the need for prompt action, except in terms of the 
need to act immediately once the police were committed to a course of ac-
tion. There is no explanation of the relevance of the failure to secure a 
valid warrant prior to the seizure nor is there any explanation as to why 
maintenance of the status quo pending the issuance of a valid warrant 
would not have been a satisfactory course of action. 
Finally, Justice White's opinion represents a moderating voice 
between the two opposing positions. The clear thrust of Justice White's 
opinion is one of practicality. His opinion, in effect, advances the position 
that Justice Stewart's analysis of the exigent nature of the circumstances 
involves drawing very questionable factual distinctions. Although he does 
not specifically argue that such distinctions would create a very difficult 
position for law enforcement officials, it is likely that he had the problem 
in mind. In the alternative, Justice White argued that if Justice Stewart's 
line-drawing philosophy were to be accepted, he saw little reason not to 
carry it to its logical conclusion and acknowledge that the entire premise of 
warrantless automobile searches (mobility) is one that simply cannot be 
supported. 
The three major automobile search cases following Coolidge em-
phasize the continuing division on the Court concerning the basis and 
scope of the automobile search exception. The three cases also represent an 
attempt on the part of some members of the Court to seek a more satisfac-
tory basis for upholding the validity of warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles. 
The first case following Coolidge was Cady v. Dombrowski, 121 a case 
involving a warrantless search of the defendant's automobile following an 
accident. The automobile had been towed to a private, unguarded lot and 
the defendant, a Chicago police officer, had been taken into custody on a 
drunken driving charge. The police had reason to believe that the defen-
dant had his service revolver in his possession at the time of the accident. 
Unable to find the revolver on the person of the accused, the police, under 
"standard procedure," returned to the vehicle three hours later and con-
ducted an extensive search. 122 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion sustained the warrantless 
121 413 u.s. 433 (1973). 
122 !d. at 436-37. The search in Cady included examining the contents of the trunk. 
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search, and, in the process, discussed the basis for the automobile search 
exception in some detail. One of the most significant aspects of the majori-
ty opinion is that it represents the first case in which a justification for a 
warrantless search of an automobile, other than mobility, is fully dis-
cussed. Justice Rehnquist's opinion recognized that warrantless searches of 
automobiles have traditionally been sustained because of the automobile's 
"vagrant and mobile nature. " 123 He goes on, however, to hold that war-
rantless automobile search cases may be constitutionally distinguished 
from warrantless searches of homes and similar structures because of the 
"extensive, and often noncriminal contact with automobiles [that] 
will bring local officials in 'plain view' of evidence, fruits, or instrumen-
talities of crime, or contraband. " 124 In other words, the warrantless search 
of the defendant's automobile in Cady, where the defendant was in 
custody and there were no circumstances present to justify a reasonable 
belief that the automobile would be quickly moved out of the locality, was 
nevertheless sustained as not unreasonable within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment. The four dissenting Justices in Cady, in an opinion 
written by Justice Brennan, were not incorrect in observing that the basis 
of the majority opinion, "despite [its] asserted adherence to the principles 
of our prior decisions," rested "on a subjective view of what is deemed ac-
ceptable in the way of investigative functions performed by rural police 
officers. " 125 The four dissenting Justices in Cady, not surprisingly, were 
the same I our members concurring in the plurality opinion in Coolidge. 
One year later, the Court decided Cardwell v. Lewis!26 another war-
rantless automobile search case in which the Justices split along exactly the 
same lines as in Cady, with the exception of Justice Powell who concurred 
in the result on nonsubstantive grounds. 127 In Cardwell, the automobile 
was seized from a private parking lot and towed to the police impound-
ment lot at a time when the defendant was in custody. The next day tire im-
pressions were taken, along with paint specimens from the vehicle's fender, 
which proved incriminating. 128 Justice Blackmun's opinion is unique 
because it discusses the police activities of seizing the automobile separate 
from the acts of making the tire impressions and taking the paint 
specimens. The first part of the opinion, devoted to the latter question, is 
123 !d. at 441. See text accompanying note 98 supra. 
124 !d. at 442. 
125 !d. at 453. 
126 417 u.s. 583 (1974). 
127 Id. at 596. Mr. Justice Powell concurred on the ground that federal habeas corpus 
should not be available to state prisoners challenging fourth amendment issues, a position later 
sustained by the Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
128 /d. at 587-88. 
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significant because of Justice Blackmun's articulation of the justification 
for the automobile search exception. Like Justice Rehnquist's opinion in 
Cady, Justice Blackmun gives specific recognition to the historical 
justification for the automobile search exception-the exigent cir-
cumstances that exist in connection with movable vehicles-in that "the 
opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable. " 129 He went 
on, however, like Justice Rehnquist in Cady, to justify the exception on 
alternate grounds. According to Justice Blackmun, the search of an 
automobile is far less intrusive on fourth amendment rights because "[o]ne 
has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is 
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository 
of personal effects." 130 This justification was particularly compelling in 
Cardwell as "nothing from the interior of the car and no personal ef-
fects ... were searched or seized .... " 131 According to Justice Blackmun, the 
expectation of privacy involved with respect to the tire imprints and paint 
specimens was "abstract and theoretical. " 132 
Justice Blackmun dealt with the initial seizure of the automobile as a 
separate and distinct problem. His opinion places principal reliance on the 
Chambers case to support the seizure. According to Justice Blackmun, 
because the "search" of the automobile could have been made "on the 
spot," there was no constitutional significance to the prior seizure and 
impoundment of the vehicle. 133 The analysis first utilized in 
Chambers-refusing to draw constitutional distinction between a defen-
sive seizure pending the issuance of a warrant and an immediate 
search-was reaffirmed. Coolidge was distinguished as involving the 
seizure from the defendent's driveway, requiring entry upon private pro-
perty, as opposed to a seizure from a public place (a privately owned park-
ing lot) where "access was not meaningfully restricted." 134 Finally, Justice 
Blackmun summarily rejected an attempt to distinguish Chambers on 
grounds that probable cause to search the car in Cardwell existed for some 
time prior to the actual seizure and search, thus negating the supposed ''ex-
igency." According to Justice Blackmun, there is "no case or principle 
that suggests that the right to search ... under exigent circumstances [is] 
foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable 
moment. " 135 
129 /d. at 590, quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50· 51 (1970). 
130 /d. at 590. 
131 /d. at 591. 
132 /d. at 592, quoting Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 
865 (1974). 
133 /d. at 593. 
134 /d. 
135 /d. at 595. 
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The four dissenting Justices rejected Justice Blackmun's initial 
separate analysis of the search and seizure aspects of the case. The basis of 
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion is very similar to the thesis of his 
Coolidge opinion: that the justification for warrantless automobile 
searches is based upon the exigency of mobility and where there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the automobile would or could be moved, the 
"exception" is inapplicable. 136 His analysis of the facts presented in 
Cardwell-the defendant and the keys to his automobile were securely 
within police custody-led to the conclusion that there was no likelihood 
that the defendant or others could have moved or meddled with the car 
during the time necessary to secure a warrant. 137 
The automobile search exception, following Cardwell, might be ac-
curately summarized as follows: an automobile may be seized without a 
warrant on the open highway (or while on other public or quasi-public 
grounds) upon probable cause. The automobile may be searched on the 
spot or taken into police custody and "searched" at a later time (but not 
one year after the seizure). 138 The right to seize and search without a war-
rant is based on (1) the mobile nature of the item (presumably because 
some human being might move it); (2) the frequency of police contact with 
the item in the public sector; and (3) the nature of automobiles as means of 
transportation which seldom serve as a residence or as the repository of 
personal effects. Opportunity to secure a warrant prior to the seizure or 
search is not a relevant factor, nor is an examination of the likelihood of 
movement by the defendant (or others) if the seizure or search is delayed 
pending application for a warrant. Finally, temporary seizure and custody 
pending application for a warrant to search is not an adequate alternative 
because the fourth amendment does not distinguish between warrantless 
seizures, on the one hand, and warrantless searches on the other. 
The Court's most recent automobile search case, South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 139 represents a distillation of the theories described above. In 
Opperman, the defendant's illegally parked automobile was towed to the 
police impoundment lot. Noticing valuables in plain view inside the 
automobile, the police gained entrance to the locked vehicle and in the pro-
cess of taking an inventory of the contents according to "standard police 
procedures," discovered marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment. 140 
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion upholding the validity of the war-
rantless search described the Court's prior automobile search cases as 
136 Id. at 597-98. See text accompanying notes 111-114 supra. 
137 I d. at 598. 
138 See note 120 supra. 
139 428 u.s. 364 (1976). 
140 I d. at 365-66. 
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based on two principal differences between automobiles and homes or of-
fices. The first he described as based on the "inherent mobility of 
automobiles creat[ing) circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical 
necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is 
impossible. " 141 The second basis for the distinction used by the Chief 
Justice combined the analysis first seen in Cady and Cardwell and is 
described as resting on the lesser "expectation of privacy with respect to 
one's automobile ... than that relating to one's home or office." 142 The 
lesser expectation of privacy is more fully described as resting on the dual 
premise of the frequency of police contact with automobiles in community 
caretaking functions (the justification utilized in Cady), and the fact that 
automobiles seldom serve as repositories for personal effects and are fre-
quently in plain view (the justification first utilized in Cardwel/). 143 Given 
Chief Justice Burger's view of the foundation for the warrantless 
automobile search exception, it is not surprising that he found the pro-
cedure followed in Opperman as "reasonable" within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment. 
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Opperman is perhaps more 
significant than the majority opinion because it is based on the assertion 
that the Court's prior automobile search cases create no general 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 144 Rather, in the opinion 
of Justice Powell, the prior cases simply give recognition to the constitu-
tional distinction "between houses and cars," a distinction that may in 
some cases, according to Justice Powell, justify a warrantless search. 145 
Chadwick and G. M. Leasing Corp.: Two Recent Cases 
Otherwise Confusing the Issues? 
Two cases decided during the 1976-77 term of the Court provide con-
tinuing examples of the problems associated with the exigent circumstances 
doctrine. In G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 146 the government had 
issued a jeopardy assessment against one George I. Norman for failure to 
pay federal income taxes over a two-year period. Agents of the Internal 
Revenue Service, without a warrant, entered the business office of the peti-
tioner, G. M. Leasing Corp., under the belief that the petitioner was Nor-
man's "~Iter ego" and a repository for at least some of his personal assets, 
and seized various furnishings, books, and records. Prior to the entry and 
141 /d. at367. 
142 /d. 
143 /d. at 368. See text accompanying note 130 supra. 
144 !d. at 382. 
145 /d. 
146 429 u.s. 338 (1977). 
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seizure the agents had visited the premises and left without incident. The 
offices were kept under observation and information was obtained that 
certain items were being moved. Two days later, the agents forcibly entered 
and conducted their warrantless search and seizure. 147 The Supreme Court 
assumed that the government possessed probable cause to believe that the 
assets held by petitioner were properly subject to seizure in satisfaction of 
the assessment against Norman, and limited its decision to the question of 
whether a warrant was required to validate the entry into and seizure of 
goods from the petitioner's office. 148 A unanimous Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice Blackmun, invalidated the warrantless search and 
seizure. Following an extensive discussion rejecting various claims by the 
government that the special problems associated with enforcement of the 
Internal Revenue Code justified the actions, the Court dealt with the 
government's claim that the facts of this case brought it "within the 'ex-
igent circumstances' exception to the warrant requirement. " 149 Justice 
Blackmun's rejection of the government's position was terse: 
[T]he agents own actions, however, in their delay for two days following their 
first entry, and for more than one day following the observation of materials 
being moved from the office, before thay made the entry during which they 
seized the records, is sufficient to support the District Court's implicit 
finding that there were no exigent circumstances in this case. ISO 
No authority was cited by Justice Blackmun for the assertion that govern-
ment opportunity to secure a warrant at the earliest practicable time was a 
relevant consideration in warrantless search cases. 
Chief Justice Burger wrote a short concurring opinion, also without 
citation of authority, describing the case as providing a "classic illustra-
tion" of the dividing line between an unlawful warrantless search and one 
permitted under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. 151 He explained further that the "agents' delay after observ-
ing [these highly suspicious] events makes that exception to the warrant re-
quirement unavailable .... By failing to act at once, the exigency was 
dissipated .... " 1s2 
In United States v. Chadwick,1s3 the Court, in an opinion written by 
Chief Justice Burger, invalidated the warrantless search of a footlocker 
seized from the trunk of an automobile following the arrest of three defen-
147 Jd. at 345-46. 
148 /d. at35l. 
149 /d. at 358. 
ISO /d. at 358-59. 
lSI /d. at 361. 
IS2 /d. 
153 433 u.s. 1 (1977). 
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dants suspected of possessing marijuana. The police had been alerted to 
the activities of the defendants by railroad officials who suspected the 
defendants of being drug traffickers. Federal agents, using a police dog 
trained to detect marijuana, concluded that the footlocker contained the 
contraband and watched while the defendants moved the locker from the 
train station to their automobile. When the locker was placed in the trunk, 
the defendants were arrested and the locker was seized. The testimony at 
trial established that from the moment of arrest the footlocker remained 
under the exclusive control of the law enforcement officers. After 
transporting the defendants and the footlocker to the federal building, ap-
proximately ninety minutes following the arrest, the footlocker was 
opened. 1s4 
The majority opinion accepted, and the defendants did not challenge, 
the findings of the First Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the seizure of 
the footlocker at the time of arrest. The sole question before the Court 
concerned the legality of the warrantless opening of the footlocker under 
circumstances where probable cause existed to believe that it contained 
contraband. Iss 
All of the opinions, including those of the dissenting Justices, first re-
jected the argument advanced by the government that the fourth amend-
ment warrant clause protects only interests identified with the home. 156 The 
government also advanced two other arguments to support the warrantless 
search. First, the government contended that although the seizure and 
search did not come directly under the automobile search exception to the 
warrant requirement, the reasoning and logic of the exception could be 
used by analogy to support their activities. 1s7 Second, the government 
argued that the law enforcement officials should be permitted to undertake 
a warrantless search upon probable cause of any property "in the posses-
sion" of a person arrested in public. 1s8 
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion rejected the automobile 
search analogy because of two basic distinctions drawn from the underly-
ing justification for the automobile search exception to the warrant re-
quirement. First, the "mobility" justification for the automobile search 
exception was not present in the case of the footlocker because "[o]nce the 
federal agents had seized it ... and had safely transferred it to the ... federal 
building ... there was not the slightest danger that [it] or its contents could 
have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained. " 1s9 
IS4 /d. at4. 
ISS /d. at 3. 
IS6 ld. at 7, 16-17. The government advanced the argument that the fourth amendment's 
warrant clause protection should be limited to dwellings and other "high privacy" areas. Justice 
Brennan, concurring, found such an argument "deeply distressing." ld. at 16. Justice Blackmun, 
dissenting, characterized the argument as an "extreme view" of the fourth amendment. I d. at 17. 
IS7 Id. at 11-12. 
ISS /d. at 14. 
IS9 Id. at 13. 
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The automobile, on the other hand, was described by the Chief Justice as 
of a different character because adequate storage facilities may not be 
available and because their size and inherent mobility makes them suscepti-
ble to theft or intrusion by vandals. 160 Second, the "diminished expectation 
of privacy" justification for the automobile search exception did not apply 
to the search of a footlocker because its "contents are not open to public 
view, except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor 
is [it] subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing 
basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, 
luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. " 161 
The Chief Justice disposed of the government's second argument in 
support of the warrantless search by stressing that search rights incident to 
arrest are based on the exigencies of the situation facing an officer at the 
time of a custodial arrest: the danger that the person arrested may seek to 
use a weapon or that evidence may be concealed or destroyed. Thus, 
warrantless searches of items within the "immediate control" are 
reasonable. 162 He concluded by holding that "[o]nce law enforcement of-
ficers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately 
associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, ... a 
search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. " 163 
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 
understandably had difficulty distinguishing the luggage search in 
Chadwick from the philosophy expressed in a number of prior warrantless 
search cases sustained by the Court. He pointed out that under the holding 
in Edwards/64 a warrantless search of personal effects may be delayed a 
number of hours while the suspect remains in custody, and under a series 
of holdings dealing with warrantless automobile searches, the car may be 
impounded and, with probable cause, its contents (including locked com-
partments) subsequently examined. 165 Finally, he pointed out that once a 
car has been impounded for any reason, the police may inventory the con-
tents without probable cause. 166 
Justice Blackmun also emphasized the "perverse" result reached due 
to the "fortuitous circumstances" of the present case. 167 He pointed out 
that either an earlier or later arrest of the defendants would have been suf-
ficient to sustain the warrantless search of the footlocker under existing 
doctrines. For example, had the officers delayed the arrest until the defen-
dants started to drive away, then the car could have been seized and its con-
160 /d. at 13 n.7. 
161 /d. at 13. 
162 /d. at 14. 
163 /d. at 15. 
164 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). 
165 433 u.s. 1, 18-19 (1977). 
166 /d. at 19. 
167 /d. at 22. 
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tents, including luggage, searched without a warrant. Alternatively, the 
agents could have arrested the defendants in the railroad station while they 
were seated on the locker (and presumably, the locker would have been 
within the area of "immediate control") and conducted the search at that 
time. 168 
G. M. Leasing Corp. and Chadwick have created several anomalies 
in the law at a time when the Court appeared to be moving away from the 
artificial lines drawn by prior cases utilizing an exigent circumstances base 
of analysis. Robinson 169 and the trilogy of automobile search cases begin-
ning with Cady110 appeared to be moving the Court away from an exigent 
circumstances approach to warrantless search cases, presumably because, 
in part, the system was fraught with inconsistencies. G. M. Leasing Corp. 
and Chadwick, on the other hand, have created a great deal of uncertainty. 
First, it is clear that they were decided on the basis of an evaluation of the 
particular circumstances facing the law enforcement officials in each case. 
The Court made highly subjective judgments concerning the propriety of 
police activities. More important, the Court viewed the cases as turning on 
the existence or nonexistence of exigent circumstances warranting prompt 
action, i.e., a warrantless search. Second, albeit without full discussion, the 
Court introduced a system of analysis which may provide the basis for 
reconsideration of a whole line of warrantless search cases which have been 
based on unrealistic and artificial judgments concerning the existence or 
nonexistence of exigent circumstances. G. M. Leasing Corp. may be pro-
perly viewed as approving the philosophy that law enforcement officials 
must secure a search warrant at the earliest practicable moment; failure to 
do so will invalidate a subsequent warrantless search. It is difficult not to 
view the case as a movement back to the Trupiano doctrine. 171 Chadwick, 
on the other hand, may be properly viewed as approving the concept that 
defensive maintenance of the status quo pending the issuance of a search 
warrant is required in certain circumstances. Unfortunately, neither case 
fully discussed the implications of accepting such doctrines as part of the 
body of the fourth amendment warrant clause. 
Conclusion 
As the foregoing analysis of recent cases demonstrates, cogent 
arguments can be made that a system of analysis of the application of the 
fourth amendment's warrant clause that turns on the existence or nonex-
istence of supposed exigencies is largely responsible for the lack of con-
sistency in the cases, as well as the absence of sound logic. One might per-
168 /d. at 22-23. 
169 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
170 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 
(1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
171 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). See text accompanying notes 61-67 
supra. 
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suasively argue that the "system" was doomed to fail from the beginning 
because of the Supreme Court's failure to recognize and resolve two fun-
damental issues. First, the Court has never definitively reexamined the 
logic of its cases that refuse to consider the time frame immediately prior to 
the search in order to determine if the government could have secured a 
warrant without jeopardizing the efficacy of the search or the safety of of-
ficers. It is one thing to say that an automobile stopped on the open 
highway may be searched with probable cause without a warrant because it 
could be moved during the delay necessary to obtain the warrant. It is quite 
another matter to validate such activity if the facts giving rise to probable 
cause to search were known to the police long before the actual stop and 
search took place and no attempt was made to secure a warrant. 
Four members of the Court in Coolidge recognized the weakness of a 
system that does not take into account police activity prior to the search. 
However, Justice Stewart did not attempt a complete modification of the 
system, but merely invalidated the warrantless seizure of an automobile 
from private property when the police had known for some time the 
probable role of the automobile in the crime. The reason Justice Stewart's 
opinion did not go further was obvious: it would have amounted to a 
reinstatement of the principles of the Trupiano decision. Prior to 
Coolidge, the Court's only major consideration of the question occurred 
in 1948 in Rabinowitz when Trupiano was overruled. The decision in 
Rabinowitz was at a time when neither the theory nor the specific applica-
tion of "exceptions" to the warrant requirement were fully developed. The 
G. M. Leasing Corp. case, on the other hand, was decided adverse to the 
government on the basis of the failure of the police to obtain a warrant 
during the two-day delay between the time probable cause arose and the 
time of the search. However, the decision on G. M. Leasing Corp. is 
devoid of analysis and authority and various circumstances can be iden-
tified to limit the impact of the case. 172 If the Court chooses to adhere to 
the system of permitting warrantless searches only in exceptional cases, 
defined with reference to the existence of exigent circumstances, the theory 
of Trupiano must be thoroughly reconsidered. Reinstatement of 
Trupiano, of course, presents a wide range of difficult problems, 
theoretical as well as practical. The most difficult question presented by 
reinstatement of Trupiano would be its effect on the search incident to ar-
rest exception. It seems almost inconceivable that the Court would be will-
ing to deny the right to search incident to arrest if the police, prior to the 
arrest, could have obtained a search (or arrest) warrant. 
172 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977), involved a warrantless entry 
into a private office. Given the long history of viewing private homes and offices as providing the 
maximum protection from warrantless government intrusions, G.M. Leasing Corp. might be so 
limited and thus inapplicable to automobile searches. Also, G.M. Leasing Corp. involved enforce-
ment of the Internal Revenue laws and, although the holding in the case apparently did not turn on 
such fact, it might be reasonably viewed as limited to that type of case. 
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Second, the Court has never definitively resolved the question of 
whether a limited maintenance of the status quo with probable cause, 
pending application for a warrant, is permissible procedure. If the govern-
ment is permitted, for example, to seal off a dwelling or seize an 
automobile pending the issuance of a warrant for a search, there would be 
very few cases that would involve the need for an immediate, full-scale 
warrantless search. The trouble with such a procedure, however, was 
discussed in Chambers by Justices White and Harlan. The fourth amend-
ment protects against warrantless seizures as well as searches. It is difficult 
to maintain that a defensive seizure or sealing-off of property pending is-
suance of a warrant is any less a violation of the fourth amendment than a 
warrantless search itself. However, as Justice Harlan argued in Chambers, 
viewed from the perspective of the individual who is the subject of the 
government action it is easy to view the protection of the possessory in-
terest at stake when the question is seizure of property as a less valued right 
than the privacy interest at the heart of the fourth amendment's search 
restrictions. 173 In addition, as Justice Harlan argued, the individual who is 
concerned by the disruption of the possessory interest when property is 
temporarily seized may always consent to an immediate warrantless search 
in order to promptly regain full control over the property. 174 There is one 
additional problem with so-called defensive seizures. If such activity is 
viewed as implicating the fourth amendment warrant clause, why should 
the police be permitted to make a warrantless seizure to maintain the status 
quo if they had opportunity to secure a warrant prior to the defensive 
seizure? In at least one case involving the search of a dwelling, a majority 
of the Court implicitly recognized defensive seizures pending issuance of a 
warrant as a basis for rejecting the government's claim that exigent cir-
cumstances necessitated a warrantless search of the dwelling. 175 More 
173 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,64 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring and dissenting). 
174 /d. 
175 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). In Vale the Court invalidated the warrantless 
search of the defendant's dwelling. The defendant had been observed consummating a narcotic 
transaction in front of his home and was arrested on the front steps thereof. The officers entered 
the dwelling and made a "cursory inspection" of the home to ascertain if anyone else was present. 
Moments later, the defendant's mother and brother arrived. The police then searched the dwelling 
and seized a quantity of narcotics. /d. at 32-33. Rejecting the holding of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court validating the warrantless search on grounds that the police did not know whether anyone 
else was present who might destroy the evidence, the Court stated that, "Such a rationale could 
not apply to the present case, since by their own account the arresting officers satisfied themselves 
that no one else was in the house when they first entered the premises." /d. at 34. The majority 
opinion did not discuss the constitutional basis for the initial "protective sweep" nor did it discuss 
why it was unreasonable for the officers to assume that the mother and brother, alerted to the fact 
of the defendant's arrest, would destroy whatever evidence was inside the home if the police left 
the premises to secure a warrant. If the majority opinion assumed that the officers could lawfully 
remain at the scene pending issuance of a warrant to protect against possible destruction of 
evidence (there was no specific mention of the question in the majority opinion), the basis of the 
assumption was not articulated. 
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recently, in Chadwick, the Court invalidated the warrantless search of a 
suitcase (lawfully seized without a warrant) because of the absence of ex-
igent circumstances once the police had obtained complete control over the 
item. 
Further consideration of constitutional validation of defensive 
seizures with probable cause presents the most appealing alternative to the 
present system of analysis. Although Justice White is certainly on firm 
ground in asserting that the fourth amendment protection extends to 
seizures as well as searches, it is also true that the Court has, in other con-
texts, emphasized that individual privacy, not the possessory interest, is the 
paramount value at the heart of the fourth amendment. 176 It would be con-
sistent with existing fourth amendment values, therefore, to recognize that 
while warrantless seizures of property with probable cause, including 
within that concept the act of sealing off or denying access to property, are 
within the reach of the fourth amendment, such actions are presumptively 
reasonable so long as prompt action is taken to validate such action if a 
search is contemplated. Such a system of analysis, of course, would have 
no application to the search incident to arrest situation, except when items 
are seized from an individual without the necessity of a search and a fur-
ther intrusion is contemplated. Edwards and Chadwick provide examples 
of the application of such a procedure in search incident to arrest cases. 
Regardless of the nature of the analysis used, it should be clear that 
one of the problems with the Court's current position is the long-standing 
assumption that fourth amendment warrant issues can be solved with 
reference to the factual findings regarding the existence or nonexistence of 
exigent circumstances. The so-called "automobile exception" is the best 
example of the weakness of a single analytical system. It is one thing to say 
that a search of an automobile, as compared to a search of a dwelling, 
presents an exigent circumstance because the automobile is inherently 
mobile and could be moved out of the jurisdiction if the search is delayed 
pending issuance of a warrant. It is quite another matter, however, to 
assume also that there is any less chance that the object of the search within 
a dwelling will not be moved or destroyed pending the issuance of warrant. 
The point is not the lack of logic in the assumptions regarding human 
behavior in the foregoing example. Instead, the lack of sound analysis lies 
in the assumption that we should treat automobile searches in the same 
fashion as we treat dwelling house searches, or even that all automobile 
searches should be treated under a single analytical system. During the past 
three years there has been a movement by certain members of the Court 
away from a single approach to all fourth amendment warrant issues. 
Robinson, for example, emphasized that warrantless searches incident to 
arrest were constitutionally permissible because they were "reasonable," 
176 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on 
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 377-A09 (1974). 
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as well as because they always involve the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances. In addition, Cady, Caldwell, and more .important, 
Opperman, involve a recognition that warrantless automobile "searches" 
may be justified on sound grounds and not necessarily solely because of the 
exigencies involved. Such decisions represent a partial step in the direction 
of restoring sound analysis and consistency in fourth amendment warrant 
cases. 
In the final analysis, the state of disarray in the Supreme Court war-
rantless search cases can be overcome by utilization of several alternative 
theories. The Court could eliminate the system of analysis which is based 
on the existence or nonexistence of exigent circumstances, except in situa-
tions such as those facing the police in Warden v. Hayden 111 and 
Schmerber v. California. 178 In the alternative, the Court could take a more 
realistic approach to the system of analysis based upon the existence or 
nonexistence of exigent circumstances by instituting a policy which would 
favor defensive seizures pending the issuance of a search warrant or which 
would take into account police opportunity to secure a warrant prior to the 
search. Either approach would enable the Court to move away from con-
sideration of the artificial issues which have dominated warrantless search 
cases and permit the constitutional issue to be clearly framed: Given the 
nature of the individual interest protected by the warrant process, were the 
actions of the government in undertaking a warrantless search or seizure 
177 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Warden is often cited as an example of the "hot pursuit" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. See note 5, supra. In Warden, the police received information 
from two eyewitnesses to a robbery that the armed perpetrator escaping from the scene had 
entered a specified dwelling. The police arrived at the dwelling minutes later, entered, and con-
ducted a search for the defendant and his weapons. During the course of the search for the defen-
dant and his weapons, the police searched a washing machine and found clothing of the type the 
fleeing suspect was said to have worn. The Court sustained the search, holding that the police 
"acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for (the defendant) and for 
weapons which he had used .... " I d. at 298. The Court went on to hold that the fourth amendment 
"does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely 
endanger their lives or the lives of others." I d. at 298-99. Warden was recently reaffirmed in 
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). 
178 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber is often cited as an example of an "emergency" search. 
See note 5, supra. In Schmerber, the defendant had been arrested for driving while under the in-
fluence of alcohol. The police, possessing probable cause to believe that the defendant was intox-
icated, had a physician obtain a blood sample, over the objection of the defendant. In upholding 
the warrantless "search" of the defendant's person, the Court rejected utilization of the search in-
cident to arrest exception as having "little applicability with respect to searches involving intru-
sions beyond the body's surface." ld. at 769. However, the Court went on to sustain the search on 
the ground that the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an 
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant ..• threatened the destruction of 
evidence." /d. at 770. The Court specifically noted that the "percentage of alcohol in the blood 
begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops .... " /d. It is difficult to contend that a true 
"emergency" did not exist in Schmerber in the sense that the likelihood of destruction of evidence 
apparently was a scientific fact and not the mere hypothesis of law enforcement officials. 
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(or both) reasonable and limited in scope sufficient to assure that 
legitimate law enforcement goals would not be thwarted due to delay in-
herent in the warrant process. 
